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CONGRESSIONAL STRIPTEASE: HOW THE FAILURES OF
THE 108TH CONGRESS'S JURISDICTION-STRIPPING BILLS
WERE USED FOR POLITICAL SUCCESS
Laura N. Fellow*
INTRODUCTION
[L]egal scholars and commentators . . . have rendered a
near-unanimous judgment... [that proposals to make excep-
tions to Supreme Court jurisdiction] are ill-conceived and
unconstitutional. But that consensus judgment has failed to
deter or dampen political support for proposals [to divest Article
III federal courts and the Supreme Court of jurisdiction]. Such
proposals continue to be made periodically, in seeming correla-
tion to corresponding denouncements of some perceived
instance of excessive "activism" by the Court.'
Written nearly twenty years ago as part of an impassioned plea to stop
politically motivated jurisdiction-stripping measures, the situation described above
is still on point, with one exception. In the past, congressional proposals to limit
federal court jurisdiction have "reflect[ed] a substantive disagreement with the way
the Supreme Court, the lower federal courts, or both have resolved particular
issues."' 2 However, the trickle of court-curbing bills before the 108th Congress was
* Laura Fellow is aJ.D. candidate at the College of William & Mary School of Law. She
graduated from Brigham Young University with a Bachelor of Arts in political science. She
wishes to thank her family and Professor Neal Devins for his guidance with this Note.
Eugene Gressman & Eric K. Gressman, Necessary and Proper Roots of Exceptions to
Federal Jurisdiction, 51 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 495, 498-99 (1983) (footnote omitted).
2 RICHARD H. FALLON, JR., DANIEL J. MELTZER & DAVID L. SHAPIRO, HART AND
WECHSLER'S THE FEDERAL COURTS AND THE FEDERAL SYSTEM 321 (5th ed. 2003) (emphasis
added).
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somewhat unique3 in that it was simply the mere possibility of action that prompted
a congressional response.4
3 One of the only other scenarios following this pattern was the Women's Draft
Exemption Act, H.R. 2791, 97th Cong. § 1259 (1981). The Women's Draft Exemption Act
sought to remove Supreme Court and lower federal court jurisdiction over:
Any case arising out of any statute, ordinance, rule, regulation,
concerning -
(1) establishing different standards on the basis of sex for the
composition of the armed services or assignment to duty therein; or
(2) establishing different treatment for males and females
concerning induction, or mandatory registration for possible induction,
of individuals for training and service in the Armed Forces.
Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
When the act was introduced to the House of Representatives on March 24, 1981,
Rostker v. Goldberg, 453 U.S. 57 (1981), was pending before the Supreme Court. The
appellant in Rostker challenged the constitutionality of a male-only mandatory Selective
Service registration. Id. at 59. The Court issued its decision on June 25, 1981, holding an all-
male military registration requirement to be constitutional. Id. at 83.
The author of H.R. 2791 feared the Court's ruling on an all-male
draft and the bill was written in anticipation of an adverse decision. His
worst fears were not realized as the Court upheld the constitutionality
of the all-male draft. One assumes that after June 25, 1981, the bill
became moot and that the subject matter suddenly became appropriate
for ongoing Supreme Court review. Thus, once the Court made the
"correct" decision on the issue (i.e., what one Congressman saw as
"correct"), there was no need to remove the subject from the court's
jurisdiction.
Max Baucus & Kenneth R. Kay, The Court Stripping Bills: Their Impact on the Constitution,
the Courts, and Congress, 27 VIL±. L. REV. 988, 1009 (1982). While Baucus and Kay
disregarded two subcommittee hearings held in July following the Rostker decision, the basic
premise of their theory still holds true. The Women's Draft Exemption Act never reached the
floor of the House.
4 Marriage Protection Act of 2004, H.R. 3313, 108th Cong. § 1632 (2003) (amending
the U.S. Code to eliminate all federal court jurisdiction over questions arising under the
Defense of Marriage Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1738C (1996) [hereinafter DOMA]). The Marriage
Protection Act was introduced in October 2003, over a month before the Massachusetts
Supreme Court ruled that bans on homosexual unions violated the state constitution, see
Goodridge v. Dep't of Public Health, 798 N.E.2d 941 (Mass. 2003), and before any federal
courts had decided to tackle the issue. Likewise, H.R. 2028, 108th Cong. § 1632 (2003),
stripping federal courts, including the Supreme Court, of the power to hear cases involving
the Pledge of Allegiance, was introduced on May 8, 2003, well before the Supreme Court
had decided to hear the government's appeal to the Ninth Circuit's ruling in Newdow v.
United States Congress, 292 F.3d 597 (9th Cir. 2002). The Supreme Court case was Elk
Grove Unified Sch. Dist. v. Newdow, 542 U.S. 1 (2004).
It has been argued that Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003), with its emphasis on
individual rights and a need to respect human decency, fueled the marriage protection
movement. See, e.g., Linda Greenhouse, Same-Sex Marriage: The Context; Supreme Court
1122 [Vol. 14:1121
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This Note does not focus on the various judicial ends Congress can hope to achieve
through jurisdiction-stripping bills, such as freezing existing federal decisions in time
or safeguarding against a potentially disagreeable decision. Rather, in light of the
108th Congress's preemptive attacks on federal court jurisdiction, it attempts to
answer the question of why, despite eternal failure,5 the 108th Congress proposed
and considered two jurisdiction-stripping bills, the Marriage Protection and Pledge
Protection Acts.6 Unlike other academic musings on the jurisdiction-stripping topic,
this Note does not presume success for either the Marriage Protection Act of 2004
or the Pledge Protection Act of 2003; failure of these bills is a central premise of the
analysis, comfortably assumed given the past track record of congressional efforts
to curtail federal court jurisdiction.7
Paved Way for Marriage Ruling with Sodomy Law Decision, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 19, 2003, at
A24. Despite the admonitions of Justice Scalia' s dissent in Lawrence, cautioning that "[s]tate
laws against bigamy, same-sex marriage, [etc.]" are questioned by Lawrence because "the
Court makes no effort to cabin the scope of its decision to excuse them from its holding,"
Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 590 (Scalia, J., dissenting), the majority refused to extend its decision
into the realm of homosexual unions. Id. at 578 (majority opinion). Justice Scalia still
admonished the broad holding, suggesting the failure to extend the decision was superficial:
"This case 'does not involve' the issue of homosexual marriage only if one entertains the
belief that principle and logic have nothing to do with the decisions of this Court." Id. at 605
(Scalia, J., dissenting).
I FALLON, JR., MELTZER & SHAPIRO, supra note 2, at 322 ("At least since the 1930s, no
bill that has been interpreted to withdraw all federal court jurisdiction with respect to a
particular substantive area has become law.") (footnote omitted); see also Stuart S. Nagel,
Court-Curbing Periods in American History, 18 VAND. L. REv. 925 (1965) (discussing
court-curbing measures put forth during the Warren Era); William G. Ross, Attacks on the
Warren Court by State Officials: A Case Study of Why Court-Curbing Movements Fail, 50
BUFF. L. REv. 483 (2002) (comparing unsuccessful efforts during Reconstruction with those
put forth during the Warren Court tenure). But see 150 CONG. REC. H6580, H6582 (2004)
(statement of Rep. Sensenbrenner, (R-Wis.) (commenting on past successful bills that might
have stripped jurisdiction).
6 The Marriage Protection Act, as approved by the House of Representatives, reads: "No
court created by Act of Congress shall have any jurisdiction, and the Supreme Court shall
have no appellate jurisdiction, to hear or decide any question pertaining to the interpretation
of, or the validity under the Constitution of, [18 U.S.C.] section 1738C or this section." H.R.
3313, 108th Cong. § 1632 (2003). The Pledge Protection Act, as approved by the House of
Representatives, reads:
"No court created by Act of Congress shall have any jurisdiction,
and the Supreme Court shall have no appellate jurisdiction, to hear or
decide any question pertaining to the interpretation of, or the validity
under the Constitution of, the Pledge of Allegiance, as defined in
section 4 of title 4, or its recitation." The limitation in this section shall
not apply to the Superior Court of the District of Columbia or the
District of Columbia Court of Appeals.
H.R. 2028, 108th Cong. § 1632 (2003).
7 See supra note 5.
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This Note will reconsider the idea that "congressional reaction to issues of federal
jurisdiction has always been fitful and... the fits are usually induced by strong
pressures imposed by particular events or by powerful constituencies that seek to
influence results in particular causes that concern them."'8 A three-part analysis will
present a political model of congressional behavior and then apply that model to
make sense of the seemingly futile congressional efforts supporting these two
jurisdiction-stripping bills.
Part I lays out the theoretical underpinnings of the Political Systems Theory, an
undercurrent to this Note's discussion of congressional persistence in proposing
jurisdiction-stripping bills. Part II discusses the regime rules associated with juris-
diction stripping. Part II.A presents the views other legal scholars have on congres-
sional attempts to limit jurisdiction. Part HI.B develops the proposal that Congress
is more likely to propose jurisdiction-stripping bills because they are destined for
failure. This Note then concludes with the proposition that the 108th Congress's
jurisdiction-stripping bills were proposed to create low-cost opportunities for members
with staunch positions on same-sex marriage or the role of deity in the Pledge of
Allegiance to continue to assign their values when all other alternative forums had
been defeated.
I. CONGRESS AS A SYSTEM
This Note adopts David Easton' s Political Systems Theory framework.9 "Political
Systems," like the United States government, have "basic unit interactions [which]
are highly dependent upon and interrelated with one another and which as a set
exhibit boundary-maintaining characteristics . . .[,] striv[ing] to maintain the
system's integrity and cohesion."10 The crux of the theory asserts that:
Every political system exists within and is affected by the phys-
ical, biological, social, economic, and cultural environments ....
[I]ts interactions deal with the authoritative allocation of values
for a society; ... a political system is concerned with deciding
in the name of society who within that society gets what, when,
where and how."
8 Shirley M. Hufstedler, Comity and the Constitution: The Changing Role of the Federal
Judiciary, 47 N.Y.U. L. REV. 841, 842-43 (1972).
9 See generally DAVID EASTON, A FRAMEWORK FOR POLrricAL ANALYSIS (1965)
[hereinafter EASTON, FRAMEWORK]; DAVID EASTON, A SYSTEMS ANALYSIS OF POLITICAL
LIFE (1965) [hereinafter EASTON, SYSTEMS].
'0 SHELDON GOLDMAN & THOMAS P. JAHNIGE, THE FEDERAL COURTS AS A POLITICAL
SYSTEM 2 (3d ed. 1985) (emphasis in original) (citing EASTON, FRAMEWORK, supra note 9,
at 25, 36).
" Id. (citing EASTON, SYSTEMS, supra note 9, at 50).
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Within this framework, parties that "share in the effective power of the system"
are Politically Relevant Members of the system.' 2 They set policy and do the
interacting.13 A select number of politically relevant members are considered to be
Authorities.14 Authorities "exercise discretion and influence in making decisions for
allocating such valued things as wealth, power, prestige, and ideals."' 5 The value
allocations by any system's politically relevant members, particularly authorities,
are dictated by that system's regime rules.
16
Because political systems are open systems, they are constantly buffeted by envir-
onmental stresses.' 7 Stresses are categorized as (1) external demands for the Authorities
to assign particular allocations of values,'8 and (2) the internal valuations of politically
relevant members regarding their satisfaction with the system. 9 Easton identifies two
particular internal valuations: specific support and diffuse support.20 Specific support
is an attitude attributed to past value allocations. 2' Diffuse support involves more
general conceptions of the system as a whole.22 One of the aims of Systems Theory
is to determine how a system confronts and processes these stresses, considering the
goals of systemic survival and maintaining the ability of the Authorities to "allocate
values for the society and to induce most members of the system to accept those
allocations., 23 The nature of any particular political system is determined by how it
deals with its stresses. 24
A system's Authorities are tasked with "confront[ing], evaluat[ing], reshap[ing],
and process[ing]" external demands and internal valuation expectations on behalf
of the system.25 This stage is called conversion because the Authorities must con-
vert the external and internal demands into systemic responses. 26 The conversio n
responses are called output and are fed back into the system.27 The output aims to
sufficiently address the stressors and demands placed on the system.
28
12 EASTON, SYSTEMS, supra note 9, at 222.
13 Id.
14 Id. at 212-17.
1 GOLDMAN & JAHNIGE, supra note 10, at 2.
16 EASTON, SYSTEMS, supra note 9, at 205-11, For an expanded definition and discussion
of the impact of regime rules, see infra Part II.
1 GOLDMAN & JAHNIGE, supra note 10, at 2.
's EASTON, FRAMEWORK, supra note 9, at 119-20.
'9 Id. at 124.
20 Id. at 124-25.
21 Id. at 125-26.
22 Id. at 124-25.
23 GOLDMAN & JAHNIGE, supra note 10, at 2.
24 EASTON, FRAMEWORK, supra note 9, at 79.
23 GOLDMAN & JAHNIGE, supra note 10, at 2.
26 id.
27 id.
28 Id. at 185-86.
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Another critical aspect of Easton's Political Systems Theory is the distinction he
draws between "equilibrium" and "persistence." To Easton, "equilibrium" is prob-
lematic because it is "weighted with the notion of salvaging the existing pattern of
relationships and directs attention to their preservation., 29 It is a term that focuses on
status quo and typical output responses.3" "Persistence," on the other hand, encom-
passes systemic endurance and survival.3 ' It is "the ability [of the Authorities] to
make authoritative allocations of values and to secure their acceptance regardless of
the amount of change involved. 3
2
Applying the concept of persistence to a legislative structure like Congress helps
to explain its desire to remain a meaningful political system. 33 If jurisdiction-stripping
bills were seen as simply a way for Congress to make sure the courts respected distinct
separations of powers, they would be Equilibrium responses. If, however, the bills
were proposed as part of a scheme to secure acceptance of an idea in the public forum,
they would be Persistence outputs. The bills would aim to achieve more than simply
insisting upon clearly delineated separations of power. As Persistence outputs, they
would serve not as a dialogue to the courts, but rather a dialogue to the American
people - a way of trying to secure acceptance of a conservative agenda.
With this in mind, the consistent failure of jurisdiction-stripping bills has
drastically different implications, depending on the type of expected output. If these
bills are simply equilibrium responses trying to prevent abuses and maintain
political status quo, then the congressional Authorities are losing ground each time
the bills are rejected. Every rejection is an effective ceding of power and jurisdic-
tion to other branches within the system, easing the American political system into
a state of increasing imbalance. But, if these bills are persistence responses, the
effect of failure is not as dire. Since the end goal of a persistence response is to have
an authoritative allocation of value be systematically accepted, 4 one must look to
the desired result to gauge its ultimate success. For example, in Rostker,35 the House
put forth a bill to prevent the Selective Service military draft from extending to
women. Speeches were made, and passions were invoked. The Supreme Court
29 EASTON, FRAMEWORK, supra note 9, at 88.
30 Id.
31 Dean L. Yarwood, Legislative Persistence: A Comparison of the United States Senate
in 1850 and 1860, 11 MIDWEST J. POL. SCI. 193, 193 (1967).
32 id.
31 See id. at 194-95, for details of Systems Theory as applied to the United States
Congress and its decision-making trends. Professor Yarwood applies the concept of
persistence, within the context of Political Systems Theory, EASTON, FRAMEWORK, supra
note 9, to analyze two distinct sessions of the United States Senate, the 1856 and 1860
sessions. Yarwood, supra note 31, at 194-95. Yarwood identified these two sessions as
models of persistence: 1850 for its successful adherence to persistence, and 1860 for its
complete departure from the same. Id.
3" See supra note 31 and accompanying text.
35 453 U.S. 57 (1981).
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issued the Rostker decision after the first House hearing, premising the holding on
a need for courts to "show a 'healthy deference' to Congress when reviewing its
decisions on military matters. 36 This Note posits that the House of Representatives
was seeking a similar response - acceptance of desired values - from the judicial
branch and the electorate.
One key element of persistence outputs involves lines of cleavage. Lines of
cleavage are those loyalties politically relevant members of Congress consider when
voting.37 The Political Systems framework counters a recurring social science
theme, "that superimposed cleavages may result in nonpersistence" (or Equilibrium
outputs). 38 Instead it suggests that "when many lines of cleavage result from public
policy, systemic persistence is the likely result. Tensions [among politically relevant
members] are not allowed to accumulate because policy is the result of constantly
shifting coalitions."39 Members of Congress are expected to act during windows of
opportunity to align their constituents' interests with the interests (lines of cleavage)
represented by other congressmen. The opportunities for action are defined by
public policy, which is partially dictated by the public attention span.
Most actions taken to promote the Marriage Protection and Pledge Protection
Acts came after public events encouraging such action; the House was only
persistent in supporting the Acts as long as doing so remained salient to the public.
Following the 2004 election, no further action was taken on either bill.40 The
discrete moments when public attention was directed toward the debates over
legalizing same-sex marriage and the Pledge of Allegiance created opportunities for
congressmen with similar interests to work together to create persistence outputs
that reflected these interests. Press conferences and hearings, scheduled at peak
moments of public awareness, provided a way for Congressmen to urge acceptance
of their value assignments, whether conservative or liberal.
The framework laid out in this section will be elemental in suggesting that the
Marriage Protection and Pledge Protection Acts were Persistence outputs motivated
by an adherence to constituent-defined lines of cleavage, designed not to truly
reprimand a potentially activist court, but rather to help encourage support and
acceptance for the underlying moral value allocations. Effectively, the bills were
but a calculated step in systemic efforts to declare same-sex marriage illegal and
assert that the United States truly is "one Nation under God.'
36 Stand-Pat Supreme Court Defers to Others, 37 CONG. Q. ALMANAC 3-A (1981).
37 EASTON, SYSTEMS, supra note 9, at 233-36.
38 Yarwood, supra note 31, at 196. For general sources that have presented the concept of
non-persistence due to superimposed cleavages, see LEWis A. COSER, THE FUNCTIONS OF SOCIAL
CONFLICT 72-81 (1956); DAvID B. TRUMAN, THE GOVERNMENTAL PROCESS, 164-67 (1953).
39 Yarwood, supra note 31, at 196.
4 See infra apps. A and B for timelines showing pertinent legislative and judicial events
relating to the Marriage Protection and Pledge Protection Acts.
"' The current Pledge of Allegiance reads: "'I pledge allegiance to the Flag of the United
States of America, and to the Republic for which it stands, one Nation under God,
2006] 1127
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II. REGIME RULES
The United States Constitution, being "the supreme Law of the Land, 42 is the
premier regime rule: Congress may not relieve any of its stresses bypassing a law that
violates the Constitution. When contemplating the constitutionality of a jurisdiction-
stripping measure, members of Congress are presented with three possible outcomes:
the measure is expressly unconstitutional and not permitted; the measure is expressly
constitutional and is permitted; or the constitutionality is unclear. These outcomes
strictly limit the type of measures Congress can pass. As Part III will point out,
Congress can relieve stress by proposing and discussing unconstitutional measures.
A. Constitutional Analysis
As with any legislative branch action, the legislature must have constitutional
authority to act. Proponents of House Bills 2028 and 3313 alleged that Article 111
of the Constitution gave Congress the authority to limit federal and Supreme Court
jurisdiction.43 Their argument focused on language in the article encouraging the
ideas that: lower federal courts exist because of congressional creation,' the juris-
diction given to both the Supreme Court and the federal courts is subject to "such
Exceptions, and... Regulations as the Congress shall make,"45 and neither same-sex
marriage nor the composition of the Pledge of Allegiance are encompassed by the
Supreme Court's original jurisdiction.46
indivisible, with liberty and justice for all."' 4 U.S.C. § 4 (2002) (emphasis added). The
Pledge of Allegiance has been codified twice in the United States Code. Id.; 36 U.S.C. § 172
(1998). The sections are nearly identical and are titled: "Pledge of allegiance to the flag;
manner of delivery." See 4 U.S.C. § 4 (2002); 36 U.S.C. § 172 (1998).
42 U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2.
43 H.R. REP. No. 108-691, at 8-15 (2004) (accompanying H.R. 2028); H.R. REP. No.
108-614, at 5-14 (2004) (accompanying H.R. 3313).
44 U.S. CONST. art. III, § 1, cl. 1 (' The judicial Power of the United States, shall be vested
in one supreme Court, and in such inferior Courts as the Congress may from time to time
ordain and establish."). Congress also asserts that "[t]he word 'shall' in this provision is not
addressed to Congress, just as the words 'shall' in the constitutional clauses vesting the
legislative and executive authorities are not addressed to Congress." H.R. REP. No. 108-614,
at 6, n. 17 (2004). But see Martin v. Hunter's Lessee, 14 U.S. (1 Wheat.) 304, 329-30 (1816)
(placing particular emphasis on the words 'shall be vested"' and concluding that if Congress
has a duty to vest judicial power, "it is a duty to vest the whole judicial power.... If it were
otherwise, this anomaly would exist, that congress might successively refuse to vest the
jurisdiction in any one class of cases enumerated in the constitution, and thereby defeat the
jurisdictions as to all .... ").
41 U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2.
4 Id. ("In all Cases affecting Ambassadors, other public Ministers and Consuls, and those
in which a State shall be a Party, the Supreme Court shall have original Jurisdiction.").
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To bolster their reading of the Exceptions Clause, proponents of the resolutions
looked to events from the nation's emergence, citing the Federalist Papers47 and the
first national judiciary act.48 Under the Judiciary Act of 1789 and subsequent statutes,
Congress has never vested Article inI federal courts with the full gamut of potential
powers.49
The first Judiciary Act did not provide for general federal
question jurisdiction in civil cases "arising under" the Constitu-
tion, laws, or treaties of the United States. Federal question
cases that did not fall into some more specialized grant of juris-
diction had to be litigated in state court, subject to Supreme
Court review. 0
Though the Supreme Court maintained jurisdiction over state court decisions
regarding federal questions in these early times, it was only privy to review if the
state had denied a claim of federal right.5 It was not until 1816 that the Court
determined that Article III, section 2 extended judicial power to "'all cases in law
or equity, arising under this constitution, the laws of the United States, and the
treaties made... under their authority."'52
There is little to no debate over Congress's power to control the jurisdiction of
lower federal courts.53 Early discussions about the power of the legislature to create
lower federal courts emerged during the Constitutional Convention, but those were pri-
marily of a fiscal nature.' That the "National Legislature" should have jurisdiction
"7 See THE FEDERALIST Nos. 80, 81 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961)
(speaking for congressional power to make exceptions to judiciary jurisdiction so as to keep
that branch operating within its boundaries and listing goals which would require Supreme
Court appellate jurisdiction to be subject to jurisdictional exceptions). But see THE FEDERALIST
No. 82, (Alexander Hamilton), supra, at 493 ('The evident aim of the plan of the convention
is that all the causes of the specified classes [of cases and controversies] shall, for weighty
public reasons, receive their original or final determination in the courts of the Union.").
48 Judiciary Act of 1789, ch. 20, 1 Stat. 73 (1789).
49 FALLON, JR., MELTZER & SHAPIRO, supra note 2, at 320.
50 Id. See also Judiciary Act of 1789, ch. 20, § 25, 1 Stat. 73, 85-86 (current version at
28 U.S.C. § 1257(a)(2005)) (permitting review of constitutional errors made by State courts).
"' Federal Question Jurisdictional Amendments Act of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-486,94 Stat.
2369 (1980) (amending 28 U.S.C. § 1331); FALLON, JR., MELTZER & SHAPIRO., supra note
2, at 320.
52 Martin v. Hunter's Lessee, 14 U.S. (1 Wheat.) 304, 314 (1816).
13 For a general acknowledgment, see Dolores K. Sloviter, Legislative Proposals to
Restrict the Jurisdiction of the Federal Courts: Are They Wise? Are They Constitutional?,
27 VILL. L. REv. 895, 897 (1982) (noting the generally recognized principle that there is little
debate regarding jurisdiction of inferior federal tribunals).
54 Mr. Madison observed that unless inferior tribunals were dispersed
throughout the Republic withfinal jurisdiction in many cases, appeals
would be multiplied to a most oppressive degree; that, besides, an
20061 1129
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establishment was stressed, but not debated during the drafting of the Constitution."
Further, there is a general belief that what Congress created, Congress can take away.56
So it is with lower federal courts. Thus, the real debate about congressional consti-
tutional authority to transfer jurisdiction from Article m courts to state courts focuses
on how Congress can affect Supreme Court jurisdiction.
Critics argue that Congress has no authority to wrest jurisdiction from the
Supreme Court for three main reasons. First, they argue, Congress cannot exercise
any of its constitutional powers in such a way that violates the Constitution. 7
Congress has no authority to overrule ajudicial decision, especially on constitutional
law. Even if the restraints implied directly by the text of Article III do not inhibit
Congress, external restraints, inferable from other provisions of the Constitution,
will.5"
Second, any statute insulating a specific area from Supreme Court review
interferes with the function of the Court, and thus should be unconstitutional. The
appeal would not in many cases be a remedy. . . . An effective
Judiciary establishment commensurate to the Legislative authority, was
essential.
Mr. Sherman was in favor of the motion. He dwelt chiefly on the
supposed expensiveness of having a new set of courts, when the
existing State courts would answer the same purpose.
Mr. Dickinson contended strongly that if there was to be a
National Legislature there ought to be a National Judiciary, and that the
former ought to have authority to institute the latter.
Mr. Wilson and Mr. Madison then moved, in pursuance of the idea
expressed above by Mr. Dickinson, to add ... the words following:
"that the National Legislature be empowered to institute inferior
tribunals." They observed that there was a distinction between
establishing such tribunals absolutely, and giving a discretion to the
Legislature to establish or not to establish them. They repeated the
necessity of some such provision.
Mr. King remarked, as to the comparative expense, that the
establishment of inferior tribunals would cost infinitely less than the appeals
that would be prevented by them.
G.J. Schulz, Creation of the Federal Judiciary: A Review of the Debates in the Federal and
State Constitutional Conventions; and Other Papers, S. Doc. No. 75-91, at 5 (1938)
(footnote omitted) (quoting proceedings of the Constitutional Convention of 1787).
5 Id. at 32-35.
56 See Sloviter, supra note 53, at 897.
51 See LINDA MUENIX ET AL., UNDERSTANDING FEDERAL COURTS AND JURISDICTION
§§ 1.05-1.06, at 6-18 (1998).
58 "Internal" and "external" constraints were first proposed by Gerald Gunther. See Gerald
Gunther, Congressional Power to Curtail Federal Court Jurisdiction: An Opinionated Guide
to the Ongoing Debate, 36 STAN. L. REv. 895, 900 (1984).
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"essential constitutional functions of the [Supreme] Court [are] to maintain the
supremacy and uniformity of federal law."5 9 Stripping jurisdiction from all federal
courts and leaving them in the hands of state courts undermines the Court's ability to
attain a uniform body of federal law, as there is a potential for fifty state courts to hand
down fifty different, unreviewable, decisions interpreting one federal Constitution.6°
Third, judicial decisions on constitutional issues can be put aside by only two
constitutionally mandated means: a constitutional amendment or judicially over-
turning a lower decision or existing precedent.6' In the present situation, where
constitutional amendments have been defeated62 and the jurisdiction-stripping bills
are proactive, this final argument is moot. To date there is no federal decision to be
challenged that strikes down the Defense of Marriage Act or bans "under God" from
the Pledge of Allegiance. With the third concern rendered irrelevant, two challenges
to the constitutionality of jurisdiction-stripping remain to be discussed.
B. Congress Cannot Restrict Jurisdiction on Potential Constitutional Questions
There are three approaches to challenging a jurisdiction-stripping measure. The
first, and weakest, challenge argues that jurisdiction-stripping proposals are uncon-
stitutional because they restrain essential functions of the Supreme Court - namely,
"to [s]ay what the law is"' 6 3 and to declare what the Constitution means. 64 While there
" Leonard G. Ratner, Majoritarian Constraints on Judicial Review: Congressional
Control of Supreme Court Jurisdiction, 27 ViL. L. REV. 929, 957 (1982).
60 Limiting Federal Court Jurisdiction to Protect Marriage for the States: Hearing Before
the Subcomm. on the Constitution of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 108th Cong. 16 (2004)
[hereinafter Marriage Protection Hearings] (written statement of Michael J. Gerhardt, Arthur
B. Hanson Professor of Law, William & Mary Law School).
Compare Henry M. Hart, Jr., The Power of Congress to Limit the Jurisdiction of Federal
Courts: An Exercise in Dialectic, 66 HARV. L. REV. 1362, 1365 (1953) (congressional "excep-
tions" power cannot be used to advance a goal that "will destroy the essential role of the
Supreme Court in the constitutional plan"), with Gunther, supra note 58 (generally dis-
agreeing with Hart's position), and Herbert Wechsler, The Courts and the Constitution, 65
COLUM. L. REV. 1001 (1965).
61 Marriage Protection Hearings, supra note 60, at 15 (written statement of Michael J.
Gerhardt, Arthur B. Hanson Professor of Law, William & Mary Law School).
62 See S.J. REs. 40, 108th Cong. (2004) (proposing a constitutional amendment to pro-
hibit same-sex marriage). A cloture vote to block a filibuster of the proposed amendment
failed to garner the necessary three-fifths vote, failing by vote of 48-50 on July 14, 2004.
National Coalition for the Protection of Children & Families, http://www.nationalcoalition.
org/media/pr/FMAsenatevote.htmIl (last visited Jan. 21, 2006) (measure to consider
Federal Marriage Amendment was withdrawn on July 15, 2004); see also H.R.J. RES. 106,
108th Cong. (2004) (proposing the same amendment as S.J. RES. 40). The vote was taken
September 30, 2004, and failed to pass by vote of 227-186. 150 CONG. REC. H7898, H7933
(2004) (Roll No. 484).
63 Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 177 (1803).
64 See Hart, Jr., supra note 60; Leonard G. Ratner, Congressional Power Over the Appellate
Jurisdiction of the Supreme Court, 109 U. PA. L. REV. 157 (1960).
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is no significant judicial authority to support this proposition, there also is no legis-
lation that specifically undermines it by detailing the exact functions and reaches of
the Court.65 The second challenge asserts that Separation of Powers principles limit
congressional jurisdiction-stripping power.' The third challenge makes the same
assertion by relying on Due Process requirements as a limiter on congressional
authority.
67
Critics of jurisdiction-stripping measures assert that the measures are retaliatory
maneuvers against a disfavored judicial decision or potential outcome.68 While it
is undisputed that Congress has a general power to control federal court jurisdiction,
these critics contend that Congress cannot use this power to interfere with judicial
independence or preclude courts from supplying effective remedies to national
disputes. The crux of this argument claims that "[w]hile Congress clearly may use
its power to regulate jurisdiction to provide for particular procedures and remedies
in inferior federal courts, it may do so in order to increase the efficiency of Article
III courts not to undermine those courts."'
The counter to this argument is that Congress is using its power not to under-
mine valid judicial authority, but to prevent judicial abuses by federal courts. 70 To
do this, Congress has the power to determine the various realms of public conduct
that are within the purview of the states, not the federal government. A good example
of this position comes from the statements of Representative Chabot (R-Ohio) sup-
porting the Marriage Protection Act:
If we are going to change [the definition of marriage] ...it
ought to be done through the will of the people, and the will of
the people is expressed through their elected representatives,
either at the State legislature, whatever State they are located
within, or the Congress of the United States, should we determine
to take that on nationally.
Rather than having the elected representatives do this, it has
been done piecemeal by a rogue mayor, for example, in San
Francisco, or a court by a 4 to 3 decision in Massachusetts....
[T]his is an issue which has been thrust upon us by rogue
65 See MULLENIX ET AL., supra note 57, § 1.10[3], at 32-35.
6 Theodore J. Weiman, Comment, Jurisdiction Stripping, Constitutional Supremacy, and
the Implications of Ex Parte Young, 153 U. PA. L. REV. 1677, 1679 (2005).
67 Louise Weinberg, The Article III Box: The Power of "Congress" to Attack the
"Jurisdiction" of "Federal Courts", 78 TEx. L. REV. 1405, 1407 (2000).
68 See supra note 3 and accompanying text.
69 Marriage Protection Hearings, supra note 60, at 16 (written statement of Michael J.
Gerhardt, Arthur B. Hanson Professor of Law, William & Mary Law School).
70 See infra note 71.
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mayors and rogue courts, not something we chose but something
we have to do.7
This counter position is facially problematic for two reasons. First, between the
Marriage Protection Act and the Pledge Protection Act, the House is essentially
pleading in the alternative. If the House simply wants to preserve for the states
those issues they have historically had domain over, logic should estop a measure
giving the states new powers - which is what the Pledge Protection Act tried to do
by giving states control over the historically federal pledge. Second, one must ask
if the House is trying to make a jurisdictional stand via these bills, what conclusion
should be drawn when the bills fail to become law?
Cynics and academics (or are they one and the same?) charge Congress with
more sinister motivations and see more cataclysmic problems lurking behind
congressional assertions that it is merely preventing judicial abuse. In his statements
before the House Judiciary Committee during discussion of the Marriage Protection
Act, Professor Michael Gerhardt warned that the court-curbing proposal under
consideration did little more than marginalize a suspect class and/or impinge on a
fundamental right.72 To Gerhardt, "restricting access by [a particular, suspect class
of people] to Article III courts to vindicate certain interests ... because of mistrust
of 'unelected judges' ... lacks a compelling justification and thus violates the equal
protection class [sic].' 73 Further, Professor Gerhardt asserted:
71 150 CONG. REC. H6580, H6584 (daily ed. July 22, 2004) (statement of Rep. Chabot
(R-Ohio)). See also id. at H6581 (statement of Rep. DeLay (R-Tex.)).
If it is true ... that "marriage is an evolving paradigm," then
should not that evolution be an organic, natural evolution and left to the
collective and evolving wisdom of the American people?
And if, on the other hand, no such institutional evolution exists,
does not the arrogance of judges who would impose on our society
their own contrary and misguided prejudices fundamentally undermine
American democracy?
Id. See also id. at H6592 (statement of Rep. Akin (R-Mo.)) ("I somehow cannot get my mind
around the concept that the Founders' idea was that a bare majority in one State court and
a bare majority in the Supreme Court can redefine the word of marriage and shove that down
the throats of 49 other States."); id. at H6611 (statement of Rep. Cannon (R-Utah)) ("When
the judicial branch loses its moral compass, it is the responsibility of the Congress to exert
its authority to keep the judicial branch in check.... HR 3313 is simply Congress re-
affirming its intent under DOMA and disallowing judicial review."); id. at H6591 (statement
of Rep. Hyde (R-Ill.)) (commenting on how great it is that Congress can seize this oppor-
tunity to watch over the checks and balances of our system).
72 Marriage Protection Hearings, supra note 60, at 18-19 (written statement of Michael
J. Gerhardt, Arthur B. Hanson Professor of Law, William & Mary Law School).
73 Id. at 18.
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A federal law restricting all federal jurisdiction may also run
afoul of the Fifth Amendment by violating a fundamental right....
It is unlikely that the Court would find a compelling justification
for burdening fundamental rights. I cannot imagine that the
justices would agree that distrusting "unelected judges" qualifies
as a compelling justification. Nor is a regulation excluding all
federal jurisdiction over a matter involving the exercise of fun-
damental rights, for it precludes Article Ill courts even from en-
forcing the law.74
Similar complaints have been made that the Pledge Protection Act silences the
complaints of members of religious minorities in all fifty states by refusing them the
right to challenge a pledge which pays homage to a Judeo-Christian tradition.75
Since the bills failed to pass the 108th Congress, Professor Gerhardt's predictions
of doom are still untested.
C. Jurisdiction-Stripping Prevents the Supreme Court from Maintaining a
Uniform Body of Law
The House Judiciary Committee report may have based its defense of both the
Marriage and Pledge Protection Acts on the same notion acknowledged by the
Supreme Court in dicta: that "virtually all matters that might be heard in Art[icle]
III courts could also be left by Congress to state courts., 76 The cornerstone of this
argument is the mandate of the Supremacy Clause requiring state courts to enforce
constitutional principles. Because this requirement makes state courts forums for
constitutional claims, limiting federal jurisdiction does not deprive a litigant of an
independent "federal" forum. 7 7 Advancing this theory, it has been argued that the
Constitution does not restrain Congress's Article III powers, even when the jurisdiction-
stripping bills are motivated by a dislike of the court's decision or fear of an im-
pending decision.78
74 Id.
71 Cf. 150 CONG. REc. E1711, 1712 (daily ed. Sept. 24,2004) (statement of Rep. Jackson-
Lee (D-Tex.) in support of the Jackson-Lee amendment which aims specifically to "protect[]
religious minorities" from the potential for abuse created by the Pledge Protection Act).
76 N. Pipeline Constr. Co. v. Marathon Pipe Line Co., 458 U.S. 50, 64 n.15 (1982)
(plurality opinion).
77 During consideration of both bills, opponents decried this attempt to deprive American
citizens of a forum for their claims to be heard. Most often, they turned "forum of choice"
into "forum to be heard" when making this argument, entirely disregarding the Supremacy
Clause argument. See Marci Hamilton, The Pledge Protection Act: The Lunacy of Letting
Only State Courts Interpret the First Amendment, WRrr, Sept. 23, 2004, http://writ.news.
findlaw.com/hamilton/20040923.html.
78 Gunther, supra note 58, at 920 (citing Wechsler, supra note 60, at 1005); see also
Marriage Protection Hearings, supra note 60, at 21 (testimony of Martin H. Redish, Professor
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Those academics original enough to write about jurisdiction-stripping feel that
reliance on the Supremacy Clause is an inadequate and destabilizing basis for such
a potentially radical move.79 Allowing fifty state courts to apply individual stan-
dards of review to federal issues could produce extreme amounts of divergence and
unpredictability, rather than the desired single declaration of what the law is that the
Supreme Court can provide. 0 This concern translates to a constitutional argument
through a concept first proposed by Hart's dialectic: Congress may not take an
action that "destroy[s] the essential role of the Supreme Court.""1
The Supreme Court has determined that measures affecting the individual rights
of homosexuals should be looked at by courts with heightened skepticism. 8 2 While
homosexuals have not been classified as a "problematic group," society has systemi-
cally followed a pattern of enacting discriminatory practices and laws against them,
and the Court seemed to be considering somewhat heightened scrutiny in Romer v.
Evans83 to protect them from unjust discrimination. Opponents of the Marriage
Protection Act claim that prohibiting Supreme Court oversight of the development
of law in this area would be disastrous to uniform individual rights for homosexuals.8 4
of Law and Public Policy, Northwestern Law School) ("If... Congress wishes to combine its
power over the article III lower courts and the Supreme Court under the exceptions clause, the
end result is that it can completely exclude the Federal judicial power over pretty much any
issue, as long as the State courts remain available."). This power directly confronts the idea
that Congress can be constrained by the "essential functions" of Article III courts. Id.
'9 See infra notes 82-83 and accompanying text.
80 See Marriage Protection Hearings, supra note 60 and accompanying text (written
statement of Michael J. Gerhardt, Arthur B. Hanson Professor of Law, William & Mary Law
School) (voicing this widely felt concern); see also Gerald Gunther, Congressional Power
to Curtail Federal Court Jurisdiction: An Opinionated Guide to the Ongoing Debate, in THE
COURTS: SEPARATION OF POWERS: FINAL REPORT OF THE 1983 ANNUAL CHIEF JUSTICE EARL
WARREN CONFERENCE ON ADVOCACY IN THE UNITED STATES 15, 24-25 (Bette Goulet ed.,
1984).
State courts and lower federal courts, in many instances, would follow
those prior rulings. But some courts would, no doubt, feel freer to
follow their own constitutional interpretations if the threat of appellate
review and reversal were removed.... The result would be differing
interpretations of constitutional norms among the courts. And that
would be a major subversion of the value of uniformity that Supreme
Court review now tends to assure.
Id.
81 Hart, Jr., supra note 60, at 1365.
82 Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 562 (2003) ("Freedom extends beyond spatial
bounds. Liberty presumes an autonomy of self that includes freedom of thought, belief,
expression, and certain intimate conduct.").
83 517 U.S. 620 (1996).
4 See supra note 80.
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Though an emotionally compelling argument, there is nothing to suggest that
same-sex marriage is an issue invoking an essential Supreme Court function. The
Supreme Court has said "'[tihe whole subject of the domestic relations of husband
and wife, parent and child, belongs to the laws of the States and not to the laws of
the United States."',
8 5
There have been limited occasions when marriage has fallen under federal purview
because of other, overreaching federal concerns. Loving v. Virginia is the prime
example. 86 Loving was a case challenging Virginia's anti-miscegenation laws pro-
hibiting marriages between whites and members of other races.87 The Court held that
even though marriage is part of a state's police powers,8 the state's power to regulate
marriage is limited by the constitutional guarantees of the Fourteenth Amendment.89
The potentially critical distinction between marriage generally and Loving is that the
Supreme Court used Loving to guarantee fairness to a problematic group and was not
at all concerned with states' control over the institution of marriage.'
Because of this traditional deference to states on the marriage front, the Supreme
Court would not have jurisdiction over any cases covered by the Marriage Protection
Act. The only other way the Supreme Court could be called upon to exercise an
essential function is if the homosexual community were considered to be the target
of systematic societal discrimination to such a degree that they would be entitled to
heightened court protection. It remains to be seen whether laws preventing homo-
sexual marriage will be subject to the same judicial scrutiny as race-based marriage
laws, and thus fall within the existing grounds for Supreme Court jurisdiction.
I. WHY BOTHER?
A significant majority of legislative proposals never make it out of standing
committees.9 Of the bills that get to the floor, only a small percentage are con-
sidered and voted on.92 "[A] successful demand for a roll call usually means that at
least eighty-seven members feel that the issue is important enough to be worth an
investment of a half-hour of their precious time.... [R]oll calls usually are taken on
85 Elk Grove Unified Sch. Dist. v. Newdow, 542 U.S. 1, 12 (2004) (alteration in original)
(quoting In re Burrus, 136 U.S. 586, 593-94 (1890)).
86 388 U.S. 1 (1967).
87 id.
88 Id. at 7.
89 id.
90 The Court in Loving held that Virginia's statutory scheme to prevent marriages
between persons solely on the basis of race violated the Equal Protection and Due Process
Clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment. Id. at 12.
91 DONALD R. MATrHEWS & JAMES A, STIMSON, YEAS AND NAYS: NORMAL DECISION-
MAKING IN THE U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 5 (1975).
92 Id. (explaining that "80 to 90 percent" of all House proposals fail in committee).
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relatively major and relatively controversial issues. 93 For the Marriage Protection
and Pledge Protection Acts to warrant roll call votes, members of the House must
have felt the Acts either proposed politically important solutions or enjoyed signifi-
cant popular support.'
Considering the above synopsis of the tenuous legality of jurisdiction-stripping
measures, the initial question of this Note still remains. Why, in light of eternal failure,
and tenuous impact, does Congress continue to submit jurisdiction-stripping bills?
There is a possibility that supporters optimistically hope these bills will be the
rare (only) successes. For example, in a letter to his constituents, Representative
Ron Paul (R-Tex.) urged the following:
The choices are not limited to either banning gay marriage at the
federal level, or giving up and accepting it as inevitable. A far
better approach, rarely discussed, is for Congress to exercise its
existing constitutional power to limit the jurisdiction of federal
courts. Congress could statutorily remove whole issues like gay
marriage from the federal judiciary, striking a blow against
judicial tyranny and restoring some degree of states' rights. We
seem to have forgotten that the Supreme Court is supreme only
over lower federal courts; it is not supreme over the other branches
of government. The judiciary is co-equal under our federal system,
but too often it serves as an unelected, unaccountable legislature.95
He later followed up with support for the Pledge Protection Act:
I am troubled that some of my colleagues question whether
Congress has the authority to limit Supreme Court jurisdiction in
this case. Both the clear language of the United States Constitution
and a long line of legal precedents make it clear that Congress
has the authority to limit the Supreme Court's jurisdiction. The
Framers intended Congress to use the power to limit jurisdiction
as a check on all federal judges, including Supreme Courtjudges,
who, after all, have lifetime tenure and are thus unaccountable
to the people. 96
9 Id. at 10.
94 Id. at 7.
" Rep. Ron Paul (R-Tex.), Eliminate Federal Court Jurisdiction, Lewrockwell.com, Mar.
2, 2004, http://www.lewrockwell. com/paul/paull 60.htnl.
96 Rep. Ron Paul (R-Tex.), Federal Courts and the Pledge of Allegiance, Lewrockwell.
com, Sept. 25, 2004, http://www.lewrockwell.com/paul/paul205.html.
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Or there is the possibility that Congress simply intended to force all branches
of government to begin a dialogue leading to a somewhat unified position. During
a Media Availability Day in June 2004 Senator Santorum (R-Pa.) described con-
gressional activity in response to a perceived threat to the definition of marriage as
imperative, and on the verge of being reactionary.97 It was his goal to have
Congress "speak in to this issue while it is still a justiciable issue in the courts," and
before it was too late for Congress to have a significant role in policy-making.98
This Note proposes yet another, more plausible, possibility: Congressmen deliber-
ately back a politically popular measure they know is unconstitutional. In an era of
sound bites, there are countless advantages and few drawbacks to backing a measure
destined to fail. Every opportunity to speak out on an issue relevant to constituents
is an opportunity that should be strategically considered.99 Further, Congressmen
try to have each vote they cast speak to as many constituents as possible.1'00 As one
Congressman put it, "'When you are voting right, you build up points on a cumu-
lative basis. You lose them on a geometric basis; you can lose all your points on
one vote."' 1°
It is, however, very difficult to vote "right." To place the best vote - one that
wins over constituents, has a good legislative effect, reduces systemic stresses, etc.
- Congressmen must try to calculate the inherent risks and consequences of their
actions and votes as much as possible.'0 2 Even under the best of circumstances,
"setting of goals, the weighing of costs and benefits of alternative courses of action,
and the choice between alternatives on the basis of goal optimization [where the
goals are systemic stress relief and re-election] are difficult."'1 3 It is well-known
that congressmen are faced with more propositions than they have time to deeply
consider. Even with aides, it is difficult for one congressman to superficially
comprehend the issue at hand, let alone gain a solid grasp on other sorts of infor-
mation, such as the consistency of the legislation with her past voting record, her
17 Senate Republicans Hold Media Availability Following Closed Policy Luncheon, FED.
DOCUMENT CLEARING HOUSE, June 22, 2004, available at 2004 WL 1387426 (remarks of
Sen. Rick Santorum (R-Pa.)).
18 Id. Senator Santorum further cautioned, "The courts are moving. And if Congress does
not move, we will find ourselves in a position where we will be reacting to a final judgment
of a court that basically establishes a new right across this country. And at that point,
arguably, it's too late." Id. These statements were made in response to the proposed
Constitutional amendment to define marriage as a union between a man and a woman, but
also speak more broadly about the Congressional desire for positioning in the debate.
99 MATrHEWS & STIMSON, supra note 91, at 10 ('The desire to be publicly recorded
foursquare in favor of God, country, and motherhood is strong among elective politicians....").
'0o id. at 24.
'o' Id. at 30 (omission in original).
102 Id.
i03 Id. at 25.
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constituents' positions on the legislation, its direct effect upon constituents, and the
impact of the legislation."4
Beyond the question how loudly a vote will speak, congressmen must also
determine how vested in an issue their constituents are. It has been reported as a
common trend that on most issues, constituents don't care.10 5 However, there are
some exceptions to constituent apathy, such as when a bill deals with something they
can easily understand,'06 hereafter deemed "high-friction issues."' 07 "'High-friction
issues"' are not necessarily "those most crucial to the survival and prosperity of the
Republic."' 0 8 They are, however, those crucial to "do[ing] right by the folks back
home."' 9 Congressmen notice when high-friction issues arise, and they try to
structure their actions to continue the accumulation of "good vote" points by acting
on those issues. This Note proposes that one of the best ways to do this - when
dealing with controversial social issues - is to take a stand on a weak measure.
As stated above, a congressman must consider the consequences of and alter-
natives to his action. To over-simplify, the alternatives to the jurisdiction-stripping
bills put forth by the 108th Congress were a constitutional amendment or inaction.
The consequences of the jurisdiction-stripping bills, assuming they would ultimately
fail, were only positive. They carried no lasting legal or precedential effects, they
did not face being overturned by another branch of government, they provided
members of the House with opportunities to speak before their colleagues and
constituents as well as before the media, and they kept the message of morals in the
public consciousness longer in the months leading up to the election.
A. The Intangible Value of An Unpassable Measure
Congressional language justifying House Bills 3313 and 2820 track each other
as much as possible"0° and offer the same general court-curbing propositions which
have been critiqued and discussed in academia to a dizzying degree. Though the
'04 See id. passim.
05 From a survey of one hundred fifty congressmen, Matthews and Stimson anonymously
reported the responses to questions. One question asked about the level of interest or
position-taking among each congressman's constituents. One response was: "'I would have
to say that most of the people in my district do not know what is involved in major
legislation."' MATTI-EWS & STIMSON, supra note 91, at 26.
"o' Id. at 27 (statement of same anonymous congressman) ("'People generally get pretty
exercised over bills concerning ... things that they can understand readily."' (omission in
original)).
107 Id. (statement of another anonymous congressman) ("'I've seen a lot of interest
develop on... high-friction issues."' (omission in original)).
108 id.
'09 Id. at 30.
1o Compare H.R. REP. No. 108-614 (2004) (Marriage Protection Act of 2004), with H.R.
REP. No. 108-691 (2004) (Pledge Protection Act of 2004).
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above summary of arguments for and against court-curbing, as well as the signifi-
cant body of literature weighing in, suggests a jurisdiction-stripping measure send-
ing a potential constitutional question to the states is unconstitutional. Because a
jurisdiction-stripping measure has never passed the legislature, the Supreme Court
has not had an opportunity to weigh in on the debate in any significant capacity."'
Like Congress, the Supreme Court is a Political System." 2 Public opinion pro-
tected it from Roosevelt's court-packing plan,"' and public opinion arguably played
a significant role in the Warren Court issuing a unanimous decision in Brown v.
Board of Education"4 and subsequently refusing to expand the decision to such
controversial areas as interracial marriage until nearly a decade later." 5 If forced to
make a ruling on a morally popular jurisdiction-stripping measure, political forces
would also come into play as the cries of "activist judges" spiraled out of control and
the legitimacy of the Court came under attack." 6
Thus, even though presumably unconstitutional, such measures carry significant
positioning value by virtue of their timely existence, at the height of discussion:
Congress is able to maintain some clout in the discussion, rather than sit by as the
courts deal with the issues. Even though the measures may be destined to failure,
consideration of them provides an opportunity for congressional grandstanding and
base mobilization.' During consideration of the measure, supporters of the bills
can "again criticize 'activist' judges" and discuss the importance of timely action."'
If (when?) the measure fails, they can go home and say they tried. This Note theo-
rizes that failure also sends the message that while congressmen, as Authorities,
"'. Contra Exparte Yerger, 75 U.S. (8 Wall.) 85, 106 (1868) (concluding that the repeal
of "an additional grant of jurisdiction" does not "operate as a repeal of jurisdiction
theretofore allowed"); Ex parte McCardle, 74 U.S. (7 Wall.) 506, 515 (1868) (concluding
that the repeal of portions of the 1867 statute conferring appellate jurisdiction on the
Supreme Court in habeas corpus proceedings did "not affect the jurisdiction which was
previously exercised"). Exparte McCardle is the only instance where ajurisdiction-stripping
proposal had the approval of both the Congress and the Supreme Court.
12 See supra Part I for discussion of the critical elements and dynamics of a Political
System.
" Since the confrontations between FDR and the anti-New Deal Court in the 1930s,
presidential criticism of the Court has been rare, and public perception that the Court is a
fragile institution needing protection has been eroded as the Court has ruled on more social
issues. GOLDMAN & JAHNIGE, supra note 10, at 224. See generally MARIAN C. MCKENNA,
FRANKLIN ROOSEVELT AND THE GREAT CONSTITUTIONAL WAR: THE COURT-PACKING CRISIS
OF 1937 (2002).
"4 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
"' Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967).
116 See supra note 64 and accompanying text for a discussion of claims made even in
anticipation of a court ruling on a morally-popular jurisdiction-stripping measure.
"7 Keith Perine, House Conservatives Seek Voters'Attention With Action on Gay Marriage
Amendment, C.Q. WKLY., Oct. 2, 2004, at 2322.
118 Id.
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tried to pass a bill reflecting a valuation of morals, there was not enough perceived
support for that particular valuation to be accepted into the system. Such a message
encourages action on the part of constituents to reaffirm the strength of the valu-
ations they send to Congress.
B. "Traditional" Thoughts on Congressional Motivation
Though the debate about the constitutionality of jurisdiction- stripping clauses still
rages, the traditional analysis has taken the view that, even if constitutional, the pro-
posals are unwise." 9 In his testimony before the House on The Marriage Protection
Act, Martin Redish likened jurisdiction-stripping to the "moral equivalent of nuclear
war."'20 This conclusion was reached by assuming the proposals passed and then
looking at the logical extremes of potential outcomes.'2
Invocation of the "exceptions" power would be unseemly and
chaotic and would ultimately subvert the relations between the
Court and the political branches that have worked reasonably
well in our history. Moreover, as a practical matter, appellate
jurisdiction-stripping laws are not orderly and effective means
to implement congressional dissatisfaction with Court rulings.
The disfavored rulings would, of course, remain on the books as
influential precedents.'22
In assessing the wisdom of the proposals, the first question has been that of
motivation. One perspective is a procedural approach, viewing motivation as "how"
the authorities converted stresses into a decision, not "why" the authorities chose
that particular valuation. 2 3 Under this view, if a proposal is driven by proper pro-
cedure, there is no problem introducing it before a body of Congress, just because
119 See supra Part III.A.
120 See Marriage Protection Hearings, supra note 60, at 21 (testimony of Martin H.
Redish, Professor of Law and Public Policy, Northwestern Law School).
121 Id.
122 Gunther, supra note 80, at 24.
123 See Paul Brest, Palmer v. Thompson: An Approach to the Problem of Unconstitutional
Legislative Motive, 1971 SuP. CT. REV. 95.
Distinction should be made between two inquiries: (a) What (if
any) operative rule is the decisionmaker systematically employing? (b)
Why did the decisionmaker make a particular decision?.... I believe
that the term "motivation" is most usefully reserved for the latter
inquiry, which focuses on the process by which a rule was adopted
rather than on the content of the rule itself.
Id. at 111.
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motivations are not appropriate. This view assumes that the Politically Relevant
Members of the legislative system are allowed to consider impermissible factors
when proposing a general rule so long as they adhere to proper procedure and also
consider permissible factors during the proposal. 12 4 While this may be most worth-
while when looking at potentially discriminatory laws, 25 it is not as worthwhile in
this context, especially because it discounts all relevant factors of the Political Systems
approach.
A second view looks at "why" jurisdiction stripping bills are still being proposed.
One suggested "why" is that Congress is trying "to 'get at' the Supreme Court, to
express hostility to Supreme Court decisions, to provide a less interventionist forum
for the adjudication of federal claims."'' 26 Such expression of hostility is an authori-
tative way the legislative system can make known its value assignments and deflect
environmental stresses sent from constituents. The chosen procedure - "overturn[ing]
or minimiz[ing] the effect of previous activist decisions [and] ... encourag[ing] the
judicial branch to engage in more traditional decision-making that relies on the
language of the Constitution and on greater adherence to precedent"' 27 (or jurisdiction
stripping) - is merely one means to this end. Congress could be appealing to con-
stituencies, trying to influence an issue or bolster a stance, embracing the stresses.
A second suggested "why" motivation is that these bills are proposed to
encourage the political development of an issue. 28 The impact and relevance of this
"why" view depends on which developmental goal is chosen as a baseline. The first
goal is that of containing activist courts. From this position, jurisdiction-stripping
bills still exist because
some members of Congress believe the federal courts are con-
tinuing to engage in blatantly unconstitutional conduct and that
something drastic must be done to rein in an "activist Court."
They view Congress as constitutionally bound to address a
124 Id. at 114.
Rules themselves are seldom, if ever, generated by higher-level (rule-
generating) rules. Rather they are adopted through an ad hoc process
in which the decisionmaker considers and weighs a large variety of
factors. Just as someone making an ad hoc decision of specific
applicability.., can consider an impermissible factor. . ., so too can
a decisionmaker give weight to an impermissible factor in promul-
gating a general rule that is innocent on its face.
Id. (footnotes omitted).
125 See Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 239 (1976) (establishing a test mandating
discriminatory purpose before finding a law unconstitutional).
126 Gunther, supra note 80, at 29.
127 Baucus & Kay, supra note 3, at 1003.
128 See Neal Devins, Smoke Not Fire, 65 MD. L. REv. 197 (2006).
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constitutional crisis that has been brought about by federal judges
who have been prone to expand constitutional rights beyond their
historic parameters and prone to create new rights out of "whole
cloth.' 29
Yet, if this really is the goal to be achieved, jurisdiction-stripping bills are not the
"drastic" means that should be used. Employing jurisdiction-stripping bills for this
end is futile. They do not rein in an activist court; rather, they can be the means to
the exact opposite end, thus introducing more stress into a floundering system.
130
Baucus and Kay suggest that jurisdiction-stripping bills cement said decisions in
history as the "'permanent' status of the law."' 31 This hypothesis was also promul-
gated in a statement by Senator John East of North Carolina, in the context of the
abortion jurisdiction-stripping debates of the 1980s:
If Congress were to remove jurisdiction over abortion cases
from the federal courts, such litigation would be conducted in
the state courts. Some state courts might read the Constitution
as all courts read it for two centuries prior to Roe v. Wade, and
uphold state anti-abortion laws as constitutional. But many
other state courts would probably regard the United States
Supreme Court decision as a binding precedent. In these states,
Roe would continue to be the effective law, and since the
Supreme Court would never have occasion to hear another case
involving abortion, it would be impossible ever to restore a
uniform and correct interpretation of the Constitution. 32
One extreme conclusion reached when considering this ultimate goal of diluting
judicial activism is that Congress only seeks to strip Supreme Court jurisdiction so
it can "give the state courts a knowing wink and say, 'go ahead - they can't touch
you now."",133 However, if this is the intended message, it has not been received
willingly by the states. State courts have expressed concern over this suggested
motivation of stripping jurisdiction to allow state courts to make the "correct"
129 Baucus & Kay, supra note 3, at 1003.
130 Id. at 1004.
13' Id.
132 Id. at 1004-05 (quoting John P. East, The Case for Withdrawal of Jurisdiction, in A
BLUEPRINT FOR JUDIcIAL REFORM 29, 34 (Patrick B. McGuigan & Randall R. Rader eds.,
1981)). But see Ratner, supra note 59, at 936-38. Ratner argues that once the appellate
jurisdiction of the Supreme Court is removed, the lower courts would be free to disregard
prior Supreme Court rulings and interpret the Constitution differently than the now-
"stripped" Supreme Court had done. Id.
133 Baucus & Kay, supra note 3, at 1005.
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decision. In a resolution adopted by the Conference of State Chief Justices during
the 97th Congress, the justices expressed their alarm at the idea that Congress
"[gave] the appearance of proceeding from the premise that state court judges will
not honor their oath to obey the United States Constitution, nor their obligation to
follow Supreme Court decisions."' 34 Those unable to pass resolutions such as this
simply commented on the irresponsibility of this potential "open invitation to the
state courts to overrule decisions of the Supreme Court."'' 35 The argument is that,
given the failure of this goal to do anything to eliminate systemic stresses, it seems
highly unlikely that the congressional Authorities would continually introduce such
legislation for the sole purpose of rebuking federal courts for making (or potentially
making) a decision that state courts would be free to make as well. Such an action
hardly alleviates the concerns of constituents. Rather, it would potentially satisfy
some and leave others with no options for recourse. But what if members of the
House never intended to strip jurisdiction? What if they never assumed that they
would cement a present decision as the supreme law of the land? What if they never
expected state courts to disregard the Constitution? This is the presumption of the
second suggested goal of the "why" view.
C. The Advantages Behind Purposefully Supporting a Proposal Destined to Fail
The legislative system contains relative position stability because cleavages,
multiple goals, decision-making limitations, and political strategy mandate such a
result. 136
Members of Congress inhabit an uncertain world, one in which
their prospects for the future hinge on an array of factors that
often lie beyond their control. At the same time, members of
Congress are goal-oriented, pursuing the goal of reelection as
well as goals of personal and party power, and good policy.
Meanwhile, members are human beings with limited capacities
for information processing. They rely on decision shortcuts and
other tools for cognitive economy, perhaps to an even greater
extent than most other people as a result of the highly compli-
cated tasks that they face.'37
"4 128 CONG. REc. 4435 (1982).
135 Baucus & Kay, supra note 3, at 1005.
136 Scott R. Meinke, Long-Term Position Change Among U.S. House Members: The Case
of the Hyde Amendment 3 (Dec. 2001) (unpublished M.A. thesis, Ohio State University),
available at http://wc.wustl.edu/workingpapers/Meinke.pdf.
137 id.
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Typically, however, members face considerable uncertainty about how their voting
decisions will bring them closer to achieving their goals.'38 Looking to the result of
past decisions, their own and systemic results, can provide the most reliable
forecasting information about how a vote will affect their objectives.'39
Reducing uncertainty is also essential for constituents. For constituents,
[t]he chief method of ascertaining a decisionmaker' s motivation
involves the drawing of inferences from his conduct, viewed in
the context of antecedent and concurrent events and situations.
The process does not differ from that of inferring ultimate facts
from basic facts in other areas of the law. It is grounded in an
experiential, intuitive assessment of the likelihood that the
decision was designed to further one or another objective. ""
To help direct the inferences of their constituents, congressional members must
recognize "not only that their past decisions are reliable estimates of how to satisfy
the constituency but also that maintaining stable, consistent positions on salient issues
helps to build constituent trust."' 4
Assume a member of Congress has the goal of reelection in mind. "[T]hough
many constituency-related factors inform a member's initial calculation of how one
decision will affect reelection, an attention-getting event related to that decision" can
change the way values are attributed to that issue. 42 Constituents who were pre-
viously inattentive on same-sex marriage or the text of the Pledge of Allegiance may
all of a sudden have formed opinions. To the congressman seeking reelection, who
may not have a strong position either way, the best thing to do is temporarily appease
these constituents. 43 Yet, because of the visibility and controversial nature of the
topics, "members have a particularly strong incentive toward stability in their over-
time position on the issue."''
44
Past studies of congressional roll-call decisions have focused on various inputs:
party, 45 constituency, '46 interest group influence, 47 and the positions of other
138 id.
139 Id.
140 Brest, supra note 123, at 120-21.
141 Meinke, supra note 136, at 3.
142 Id. at 5.
143 Ronald E. Weber & William R. Shaffer, Public Opinion and American State Policy-
Making, 16 MIDWEST J. POL. Sci. 683, 697-99 (1972).
' Meinke, supra note 136, at 9.
"45 DUNCAN MACRAE, JR., DIMENSIONS OF CONGRESSIONAL VOTING: A STATISTICAL
STUDY OF THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES IN THE EIGHTY-FIRST CONGRESS 257-60 (1958).
146 MORRIS P. FIORINA, REPRESENTATIVES, ROLLS CALLS, AND CONSTrrUENCIES (1974).
141 Richard A. Smith, Advocacy, Interpretation, and Influence in the U.S. Congress, 78
AM. POL. ScI. REv. 44, 45 (1984).
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members.148 Modem studies tend to focus more on policy outcomes. The modem
dominant congressional decision model "portrays members as seekers of policy
outcomes who, when faced with a vote decision, choose policies and procedures that
lead to outcomes closest to their ideal point."1 49
"A conscientious decisionmaker . . . considers the costs of a proposal, its
conduciveness to the ends sought to be attained, and the availability of alternatives
less costly to the community as a whole or to a particular segment of the commu-
nity." 50 Supporting a jurisdiction-stripping bill need not be as black and white as
trying to directly confront an activist court. Rather, it can be conducive to com-
municating with constituents.
Statistically, there are very few costs behind backing a bill doomed to fail, espe-
cially when that failure is due to election year timing. Neither the Marriage Protection
Act nor the Pledge Protection Act saw any further consideration once the 2004
elections had passed.' 5' Because the bills have a dire history of failure, supporting
such a bill will have no real effect on the long-term legislative landscape. It is not
as lasting or drastic as a constitutional amendment. But it does still send a message:
look at my past behavior and see that I am willing to support your issues. The only
potential cost to supporting bills such as these is social division. This is a cost which
can be marginalized depending on the voter base to whom a particular congressman
is pandering. In the case of same-sex marriage, the analysis below will show that
it was possible to have the same message accepted by two diametrically opposed
groups. Finally, there are no less costly measures than these bills for either segment
of the population.
1. Application
In the months leading up to the 2004 elections, members of the House of
Representatives were dealing with a large number of stresses and, at the same time,
seeing their constituents' lines of cleavage deepen. Every seat in the House was up
for grabs.'52 President Bush was running a reelection campaign that targeted morals
and good values by consistently taking stances against same-sex marriage and in
favor of the "under God" language in the Pledge. 153 The Supreme Court had refused
to deal substantively with the Ninth Circuit's rejection of the words "under God" in
148 MATrHEws & STIMSON, supra note 91.
149 Meinke, supra note 136, at 6.
150 Brest, supra note 123, at 121-22.
151 See infra apps. A and B.
"'2 CNN.com, Election Results, http://www.cnn.com/ELECTION/2004/pages/results/house
(last visited Jan. 22, 2006).
... Kelly Beauear Vlahos, 'Values' Help Shape Bush Reelection, Fox News, Nov. 4,2004,
http://www.foxnews.com/story/0,2933,137535,00.html (last visited Jan. 22, 2006).
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the Pledge of Allegiance.'54 Numerous state legislatures were passing resolutions of
disdain for the Supreme Court and the Ninth Circuit because of their decisions in
these cases.'55 The Massachusetts legislature, unable to reach a legal compromise,
was forced by the Massachusetts Supreme Court to recognize same-sex marriage. 5 6
Five constitutional amendments, setting a federal statutory definition of marriage,
were proposed in the legislative houses. 157 Even though they were politically dis-
favored, the Federal Marriage Amendments mobilized significant constituent support.
On the days leading up to the Senate vote (taken on July 14, 2004), Congressional
offices across the country were barraged with phone calls. 58 Senator Mike DeWine
(R-Ohio) logged over ten thousand calls between July 13 and July 14, 2004, urging
him to support a constitutional amendment banning gay marriage, while Senator
George Voinovich (R-Ohio) received fifteen thousand calls in the week leading up
to the vote - thirty times more than what his office would get during a normal week,
and, at least for his office, the "'largest volume"' of calls ever for a single issue."'
To let slip such a prime strategic opportunity to speak to constituents, already
potentially mobilized, passionate, and willing to listen because of the increased cover-
age of the issues, would be ludicrous. However, a constitutional amendment carries
with it drastic and serious consequences. It permanently alters the fabric of the U.S.
Constitution. So, why not a jurisdiction-stripping amendment?
2. Marriage Protection Act
When the gay marriage issue was officially thrust into the political fray by the
Massachusetts Supreme Court in 2002, national politicians needed to quickly assess
the appropriate political strategy.' 6 The theretofore unlitigated and unchallenged
federal law dealing with same-sex marriage - The Defense of Marriage Act of 1996
(DOMA),16' defining marriage as a union between a man and a woman and explicitly
authorizing states to refuse to recognize homosexual marriages performed in other
states 162 - was on tenuous legal ground. After Lawrence and the Massachusetts case,
1' Elk Grove Unified Sch. Dist. v. Newdow, 542 U.S. 1, 5 (2004).
115 See, e.g., Kavan Peterson, 50-State Rundown on Gay Marriage Laws, Stateline.org,
Nov. 3,2004, http://www.stateline.org/live/ViewPage.action?siteNodeld= 1 36&languageld=
1&contentld=15576.
156 Id.
117 H.R.J. RES. 106, 108th Cong. (2004); S.J. RES. 40, 108th Cong. (2004); S.J. RES. 30,
108th Cong. (2004); S.J. RES. 26, 108th Cong. (2003); H.R.J. REs. 56, 108th Cong. (2003).
118 Lee Duigon, Can Congress Defend Marriage? House Advances, Senate Stumbles,
CHALCEDON REP., July 23, 2004, http://www.chalcedon.edu/articles/0407/040723duigon.php.
159 Gay Marriage: If It Won't Work in the Senate, Try the House, HOTLINE, July 19,2004,
LEXIS, News Library, Hotline File.
"6 Keith Perine & Jennifer A. Dlouhy, Parties Wary of Political Risk in Stands on Gay
Marriage, C.Q. WKLY., Jan. 10, 2004, at 84.
161 28 U.S.C. § 1738C.
162 Id.
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Goodridge v. Department of Public Health,'63 academics began to question the legality
of a law whose authority was rooted in "the power to define how states shall extend
'full faith and credit' to the 'public Acts, Records and judicial Proceedings of every
other State,""' especially considering that the "'full faith and credit' clause tradi-
tionally has been applied to reciprocal recognition of judgments and decrees - such
as divorces - but not legislation or licensing laws."'165 However, since Massachusetts
had not adopted a state DOMA, there was no forum immediately post-Goodridge to
politically support nor challenge the Defense of Marriage Act.' 66
For those opposing homosexual marriages, the strongest message possible was
to pass a constitutional amendment defining marriage as a union between a man and
a woman. For those in favor of same-sex marriage, challenging the DOMA as an
unconstitutional violation of the Fifth or Fourteenth Amendments would have been
the best alternative. However, public opinion did not seem to support either outcome. 67
163 798 N.E.2d 941 (Mass. 2003). Since Massachusetts never enacted a DOMA,
Goodridge did not challenge the constitutionality of a state or federal version. However,
"[tihe constitutionality of the Defense of Marriage Act cannot be seriously challenged until
one state legalizes same-sex marriage." What is Needed to Defend the Bipartisan Defense
of Marriage Act of 1996? Hearing Before the Subcomm. on the Constitution, Civil Rights
and Property Rights of the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 108th Cong. (2003) (testimony
of Michael P. Farris, President, Patrick Henry College), available at http://judiciary.senate.
gov/testimony?cfm?id=906&witid=2543 (last visited Jan. 15, 2006). Thus, following this
logic, the moment same-sex marriage was legalized in Massachusetts, challenges could be
mounted against other states that refused to recognize Massachusetts marriage licenses.
"6 Perine & Dlouhy, supra note 160.
165 Id.
" See infra app. A, noting that the first DOMA challenges came in the first few days
after the November 2004 elections. Litigants are seeking to challenge the laws and state
amendments through challenging their underlying foundation - the state DOMA. Their
theory is simply that if the law permitting states to ignore the Full Faith and Credit clauses
is struck down as unconstitutional, then, presumably, any state law that refuses to recognize
same sex marriages performed in states that have legalized the practice will be unconsti-
tutional as well.
167 The following chart on people's views of same-sex marriage is from an ABC News
poll:
LEGAL ILLEGAL AMEND LEAVE TO THE
CONSTIUTION STATES
All 39% 55% 46% 45%
Republicans 24% 73% 58% 36%
Democrats 47% 48% 44% 48%
Independents 44% 48% 35% 56%
Conservative 23% 73% 56% 37%
Liberal 63% 34% 38% 54%
Moderate 42% 50% 41% 50%
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"'Elected officials who are gambling their careers are walking on tiptoes. ' 16s
With every House of Representatives seat hypothetically open in the 2004 election, '
69
everyone in the House was on tiptoes. Strategically, it was critical that some position
be taken, but without knowing the full legal and political analysis, a rash response
could have added fuel to an already festering cultural war. The exact messages being
sent by constituents were unclear, and there was no past coalition on which to fall
back. 70 More nuanced questions then arose. How much of a statement should be
made considering the potential pitfalls of making a definitive stand? How much time
should be spent focusing on same-sex marriage and the Pledge of Allegiance, in
light of other issues like the economy and the conflict in Iraq?
A constitutional amendment was not in the cards. With moderate (and Log
Cabin) Republicans publicly refusing to "support any Republican candidate who
back[ed] an amendment against same-sex marriage" and vowing to redirect cam-
paign resources to "a ground game of defeating the amendment" in every state, 171
and extreme disagreement amongst conservative groups over just how broadly to
word a constitutional amendment banning same-sex marriage, 172 it would be impos-
sible to play to a broad enough constituent base to justify amending the Constitution.
Plus, "[a] lot of Republicans and Democrats [saw] this as something that could
backfire."' 17
3
David Morris, Marriage Amendments: Opinions Split over Amendment to Ban Same-Sex
Marriages, ABCNEWS.com, Feb. 24, 2004, available at http://abcnews.go.com/sections/
us/Relationships/gay-marriage.poll_040224.html (retrieved from http://www.archive.com).
"This ABCNEWS/Washington Post poll was conducted by telephone Feb. 18-22 among a
random national sample of 1,028 adults. The results have a three-point error margin.
Sampling, data collection and tabulation was conducted by TNS Intersearch of Horsham,
Pa." Id.
As can be seen here, only thirty-nine percent of the survey population believed same-sex
marriages should be legal. Of the remaining fifty-five percent believing same-sex marriages
should be illegal, there was a fairly even split as to how such illegality should be proclaimed
- once by the federal government, or fifty times (at most), once by each state.
But see GLAAD, In Depth: Public Opinion & Polls, http://www.glaad.org/media/guide/
indepthpolls.php (last visited Jan. 15, 2006); Nat'l Gay & Lesbian Task Force, Recent
National Polls on Same-Sex Marriage & Civil Unions, http://www.thetaskforce.org/
downloads/RecentNationalMarch2004.pdf (last visited Jan. 15, 2006) (discussing various
poll results concerning the legality of same-sex marriage and a constitutional amendment).
168 Perine & Dlouhy, supra note 160 (quoting Groner Norquist, President of Americans
for Tax Reform).
169 See supra note 152.
170 Perine & Dlouhy, supra note 160 (quoting David Winston, a Republican pollster and
advisor to Congressional leadership: "'The dynamic we're dealing with is not clear ....
We've had one legal case in Massachusetts, and we don't know what that means."').
"' Id. (quoting Mark Mead, Political Director of the Log Cabin Republicans).
172 Id.
'73 Id. (quoting Winnie Stachelberg, Political Director of the Human Rights Campaign).
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This Note proposes that the only other strategic option available to congress-
men, excluding inaction, was to consider a jurisdiction-stripping bill. If past trends
speak to the present, this would be a bill that would not carry many political
consequences, but would provide numerous opportunities for well-timed sound
bytes and speeches. The Marriage Protection Act was quietly introduced to the House
in October 2003.' It was set aside for nine months, only to be revived on July 22,
2004,' eight days after the Senate rejected the Federal Marriage Amendment. 76
In the days leading up to the 2004 elections, the opportunity to position the issue
in the minds of the fifty-five percent of Americans opposing same-sex marriage,
77
without polarizing the roughly ten percent of those Americans who were not willing
to allow their opposition to extend to a constitutional amendment, 7 8 was priceless.
The jurisdiction-stripping bill 7 9 appealed to some who opposed gay marriage but
were reluctant to support a constitutional amendment so long as the federal DOMA
remained unchallenged. It also created a forum for keeping the issue fresh in the
minds of constituents' 80 and created a hope that this showcasing would "drive
socially conservative voters to the polls to support GOP candidates. They also
[were] forcing Democratic politicians to decide whether to resist the initiative and
risk alienating swing voters ....
On the other side of the aisle, pressure was light on the Democrats leading up
to the election, 82 and expectations were low that the Democrats would be able put
up much of defense without further entrenching the Republican base in its anti-gay
174 149 CONG. REc. H9613, H9613 (daily ed. Oct. 16, 2003); see also infra app. A.
175 150 CONG. REC. H6580 (daily ed. July 22, 2004); see also infra app. A.
176 150 CONG. REC. S8060, S8090 (daily ed. July 14, 2004).
177 Morris, supra note 167.
178 Id.
179 See 150 CONG. REc. H6580 (daily ed. July 22, 2004).
180 Id. at H6603 (statement of Rep. DeGette (D-Colo.)).
This is the Republican leadership's last ditch effort to get a vote on gay
marriage in the House to effect the election this fall. We are
considering legislation to pre-empt an action that has not taken place.
The Defense of Marriage Act, which passed in 1996, is not being
challenged. This is a cop out, not a compromise. They know they don't
have the votes on the Federal Marriage Amendment so they are
grasping at straws.
Id.
181 Perine, supra note 117. Even though Perine's article is referencing the politics of the
Federal Marriage Amendment (FMA), proposed by Rep. Marilyn Musgrave (R-Colo.), it is
also applicable to the present issue, as the jurisdiction-stripping Marriage Protection Act was
a precursor to the House's consideration of the FMA.
182 Perine & Dlouhy, supra note 160 ("Gay rights groups have not pressed Democrats
because the groups know the minority party has no control over the congressional agenda.").
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position. 183 Lawmakers who had already positioned themselves as favoring civil
unions while opposing same-sex marriage had not lost any significant support from
liberals and gay rights activists.'84 With state constitutional amendments on the
ballots of eleven states,'85 and anti-gay marriage statutes on the ballots of another
sixteen, 186 stubborn entrenchment was the last thing gay rights advocates wanted. 187
Also, there was nothing to prove that encouraging state-centric decisions would hurt
the same-sex marriage cause. In fact, Lambda Legal's strategy was to encourage
just that: "'What this is really about is what each state is going to decide to do,"'
said David S. Buckel, senior staff attorney at Lambda. "'We're talking to the voters
and we're talking to the judges."" 88 The goal of the gay rights activists shifting the
fight to the states was to circumvent an "emotional national debate" that "could
prompt a backlash and prompt lawmakers into expanding the amendment's wording
so that it bars not only same-sex marriages, but civil unions and domestic partner
benefits as well."' 89 Thus, as consideration of the Marriage Protection Act was under-
way, Democratic supporters could keep the House on track - reminding them that
the debate was about states' rights, not about marriage - and send a message to
constituents that even as conservatives were trying to federalize marriage, they were
willing to keep the decision centralized to the states, which could allow same-sex
marriage."9 Their only other option was to continue to bring up the presumed
unconstitutionality of the bills or directly confront the same-sex marriage issue.'9'
3. Pledge Protection Act
Before the Supreme Court dismissed Elk Grove Unified School District v.
Newdow 192 on a standing technicality, 193 an Associated Press poll showed that nearly
183 id.
184 Id.
185 Stevenson Swanson, Amendments to Ban Practice Pass Handily In All 11 States, CHI.
TRJB., Nov. 3, 2004, at C8.
186 Christi Goodman, State of the Unions, STATE LEGS., Apr. 2004, at 26, 27, available
at http://www.ncsi.org/Programs/pubs/slmeg/2004/O4SLAprUnions.pdf.
187 John M. Broder, After Series of Losses, Gays Rethink Strategy, INT'L HERALD TRIB.,
Dec. 10, 2004, at 4.
8 Perine & Dlouhy, supra note 160. But see Peterson, supra note 155 ("It is always
wrong to put basic rights up to a popular vote. In the end, the U.S. Supreme Court will decide
on marriage equality and it will base its decision on the U.S. Constitution, not anything in
any of the state constitutions." (quoting Matt Foreman, Executive Director of the National
Gay and Lesbian Task Force)).
189 Perine & Dlouhy, supra note 160.
190 150 CONG. REc. H6589 (daily ed. July 22, 2004).
9' See generally Part III.
192 542 U.S. 1 (2004).
'9' Standing is "[a] party's right to make a legal claim or seek judicial enforcement of a
duty or right." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1442 (8th ed. 2004). "To have standing in federal
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ninety percent of Americans felt the pledge should be retained, regardless of
constitutional issues.'94 In his opening remarks to the House during consideration
of the Pledge Protection Act, Representative Sensenbrenner claimed this jurisdiction-
stripping proposal was one device to remedy abuses by federal judges. 9 ' However,
as can be noted from Appendix B, there was no actualized judicial "abuse" beyond
Newdow. However, there was significant concern that since Newdow was dismissed
because Mr. Newdow was a non-custodial parent lacking the standing to sue on
behalf of his daughter, it would wind its way back through the courts - in a non-
election year- and have to be addressed. 196 Considering the state support that had
come from the pledge immediately after the Ninth Circuit handed down the Newdow
decision, the House had good reason to believe the states would continue to support
the "under God" language, regardless of the Constitutional issues. 197
The election year created a window to remind the Republican conservative base
and the swing voters that there was this affront to a revered tradition. While the
salience of this issue may not have been as strong as the same-sex marriage issue
was to constituents, it continued the trend of invoking a need to preserve "morals"
that most pundits thought contributed heavily to the GOP's electoral success.
court, a plaintiff must show (1) that the challenged conduct has caused the plaintiff actual
injury, and (2) that the interest sought to be protected is within the zone of interests meant
to be regulated by the statutory or constitutional guarantee in question." Id. Furthermore,
"standing jurisprudence contains two strands: Article III standing, which enforces the
Constitution's case or controversy requirement; and prudential standing, which embodies
'judicially self-imposed limits on the exercise of federal jurisdiction."' Newdow, 542 U.S.
at 11 (citations omitted).
Plaintiff Newdow, as a non-custodial parent suing on behalf of his daughter, was unable
to establish that he had a right to make a claim, because the California legal system did not
permit him any method of filing on his daughter's behalf. Id. at 8-9. Ultimately, the Supreme
Court held, "The California cases simply do not stand for the proposition that Newdow has
a right to dictate to others what they may and may not say to his child respecting religion."
Id. at 17.
9 Poll: Keep 'Under God' in Pledge ofAllegiance, ASSOCIATED PRESS, Mar. 24, 2004,
available at http://www.firstamendmentcenter.org/news.aspx?id=12989.
'91 150 CONG. REC. H7451, 7451 (daily ed. Sept. 23, 2004) (statement of Rep.
Sensenbrenner (R-Wis.)).
196 A new complaint was filed January 3, 2005, by Mr. Newdow and eight other custodial
parents. Original Complaint, Newdow v. Congress, Civ. 4 No. 05CV00017, 2005 WL 1026867
(E.D. Cal. Jan. 3, 2005).
197 Meghan Twohey, Pledge ofAllegiance Draws New Legislative Interest, Stateline.org,
July 31,2002, available athttp://www.stateline.org/live/ViewPage.action?siteNodeld= 136&
languageld= 1 &contentld= 14909; National Conference of State Legislators, 2002 Pledge of
Allegiance Legislative Tracking as of1/31/2003, available at http://www.ncsl.org/programs/
educ/pledgeupdate.htm (last visited Mar. 25, 2005).
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CONCLUSION
Political Systems Theory dictates that external stresses and internal valuations
must constantly be handled by systemic Authorities if that system is to retain legit-
imacy and survive. For a Congress motivated by reelection concerns and strong
public sentiment about same-sex marriage and retaining the words "under God" in
the Pledge of Allegiance, jurisdiction-stripping bills were the appropriate stress relief.
For those members staunchly behind the Marriage Protection Act or the Pledge,
the bills created an opportunity to continue to assign their values to a position when
all other alternatives were no longer salient. But more importantly, they gave those
members seeking reelection a low-risk opportunity to appease (potentially newly
mobilized) constituents without requiring a large position shift.
Congressmen must weigh the costs of every decision, as well as the alternatives.
In a situation where the costs are very slight - all that is being invested is a single
vote, with little chance of any future action coming to fruition - less costly
alternatives are few and far between. Presumably, many of the supporters were
counting on the idea that these bills would not pass. The moment a jurisdiction-
stripping bill does pass the House of Representatives and the Senate, this systemic
technique will disappear because the costs of backing a jurisdiction-stripping bill
will be compounded. Legislators will actually need to look at the proposal and weigh
the impacts tied to the outcome.
Tangentially, some of the ends lambasted in previous discussions ofjurisdiction-
stripping bills - namely, trying to spark a more conscientious dialogue between
Congress and the Supreme Court - may also surface. But, as mentioned through-
out this Note, it is doubtful that Congress was really motivated by a deep, counter-
productive need to "talk" with the Supreme Court. When Congress proposes a
measure destined to fail, but which reopens debate on a politically sensitive issue,
each member has renewed opportunities to send low-cost messages to constituents.
It is only when one accepts this as the true Congressional motivation that a
jurisdiction-stripping bill becomes strategically genius.
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Marriage Protection Act of 2003, H.R. 3313, 108th Congress, 1st. Sess.
Timeline of Relevant Events during the 108th Congress
September 10, 1996
March 4, 2003
May 21, 2003
June 26, 2003
July 30, 2003
September 4, 2003
October 16, 2003
The 104th Congress passed the Defense of Marriage
Act (DOMA), federally defining marriage as a union
between a man and a woman, and allowing states the
right to refuse to recognize a same-sex marriage from
another state. Thirty-nine states have since adopted
their own versions of the DOMA.
No challenges to the DOMA had been waged prior to
November 3, 2004
Arguments were heard in Goodridge v. Dep't of Pub.
Health, 798 N.E.2d 941 (Mass. 2003).
Representative Marilyn Musgrave (R-Colo.) intro-
duced the Federal Marriage Amendment to the House
(H.J. Res 106).
Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003). Aside from
its basic ruling regarding sodomy, there was also
Justice Scalia's dissent, warning of an impending
threat to the definition of marriage and also theorizing
that the federal and state DOMAs might not withstand
Constitutional scrutiny.
President Bush addressed America and discussed the
need to codify the definition of marriage as a union
between a man and a woman.
The Senate Committee on the Judiciary conducted
oversight hearings regarding the Defense of Marriage
Act and the future of DOMA.
The Marriage Protection Act (H.R. 3313) was intro-
duced into the House of Representatives.
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November 18, 2003
November 25, 2003
Early February 2004
February 24, 2004
March 30, 2004
May 17, 2004
July 14, 2004
July 22, 2004
September 7, 2004
September 30,2004
October 5, 2004
Goodridge v. Dept. of Pub. Health, 798 N.E.2d 941
(Mass. 2003) decided, finding that the state's ban on
same-sex marriage violated the state's constitution.
NOTE: Mass. has never had a state DOMA.
Senator Wayne Allard (R-Colo.) introduced S.J. Res.
30 (Federal Marriage Amendment) to amend the
Constitution to define marriage.
San Francisco, California, and Multnomah County,
Oregon, began issuing same-sex marriage licenses.
President Bush announced that heterosexual marriages
were in danger and implored Congress to pass a
Constitutional Amendment defining marriage.
The House Committee on the Judiciary held hearings
on the Defense of Marriage Act and the "Gay Mar-
riage Amendment."
Massachusetts legally began recognizing same sex
marriages.
The Senate voted 48 yeas to 50 nays to block the
Federal Marriage Amendment.
The House of Representatives considered and ap-
proved the Marriage Protection Act by a vote of 233
yeas to 194 nays. There was not a quorum present
when this vote was taken.
The Act was referred to the Senate.
The House failed to get enough support for the Federal
Marriage Amendment (227 yeas to 186 nays).
A Louisiana district judge struck down the state's
same-sex amendment on the grounds it violated the
state's "single-subject" requirement. Georgia, Ohio,
and Oklahoma have similar single-subject require-
ments.
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November 2, 2004
November 3, 2004
November 29, 2004
Eleven states passed constitutional amendments
banning same-sex marriage (Arkansas, Georgia,
Kentucky, Michigan, Mississippi, Montana, North
Dakota, Ohio, Oklahoma, Oregon, Utah). This added
to the six other states that had passed such amend-
ments prior to the 2004 election.
President Bush was reelected to a second term, largely
because of conservative support.
A lawsuit was filed in Oklahoma district court seeking
to overturn Oklahoma's same-sex marriage amend-
ment and challenging the constitutionality of
Oklahoma's DOMA.
The Supreme Court declined to hear an appeal of
Goodridge v. Mass. Dept. of Public Health, 543 U.S.
1002 (2004).
1156 [Vol. 14:1121
APPENDIX B
Pledge Protection Act, 2003 U.S.H.R. 2028, Res. 781, 108th Congress, 1st Sess.
Timeline of Relevant Events during the 108th Congress
June 27, 2002
November 13, 2002
2002/2003
March 4, 2003
May 8, 2003
October 14, 2003
June 14, 2004
September 15, 2004
The Ninth Circuit ruled on Elk Grove Unified Sch.
Dist. v. Newdow, 328 F.3d 466 (9th Cir. 2002).
President Bush signed S2690, a bill reaffirming the
pledge in its entirety.
Numerous state legislatures passed bills directing
disgust toward the House of Representatives and also
at the Ninth Circuit decision.
Examples:
* Michigan: SR 241, calling on the Supreme
Court to overturn the 9th Circuit decision
• Delaware: HR 70, SR 18, urging Congress to
prevent the weakening of the Pledge
* New Jersey, Pennsylvania, Tennessee, West
Virginia, and Colorado all passed similar laws
calling for action and preservation of the
pledge
* Various other state legislatures passed resolu-
tions expressing disdain for the 9th Circuit.
The Ninth Circuit stayed enforcement of its decision
pending Supreme Court Appeal.
The Pledge Protection Act referred to the House
Committee on the Judiciary.
Writ of Certiorari was granted for Newdow, 540 U.S.
945 (2003).
(Flag Day) The Supreme Court decision was issued
dismissing Newdow for lack of standing by the peti-
tioner (542 U.S. 1 (2004)).
The House Committee on the Judiciary ordered H.R.
2028 reported.
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September 21, 2004
September 23, 2004
January 6, 2005
The House Committee on the Judiciary filed its report
on H.R. 2028, as amended.
The House considered the bill, passing it with a roll
call vote of 247 yeas to 173 nays.
Newdow and eight other parents renewed their case
challenging the Pledge (Newdow v. Congress, 05-00017).
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